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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* 
* In the Matter of the Estate of 
* LESTER R. THORLEY, deceased 
* 
Case No. 15350 




WILLIAM R. THORLEY, 
* 
Defendant-Respondent 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Will Contest but there was never any trial of 
the contest below. Instead, this case consists of a series of 
rulings and orders of the lower court, a domiciliary trial below but 
which is not be specifically appealed or included in the Record, 
and a final judgment admitting the will to probate without contest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the different matters appealed, the Court ruled with the 
Respondent . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Respondent requests affirmance of the lower 
Court's Orders and Judgments being appealed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As a word of explanation, the Clerk of the lower Court r" 
not numbered the pages of the Record consecutively but has d~ij 
the record into that part designated by the Appellant and that~ 
r· 
designated by the Respondent. The documents designated by the 
Appellant have been numbered 1 to 26 and the documents designate: 
by the Respondent numbered from 1 to 11. Reference to the Recorci 
this brief will refer to the Appellant's Designation or Respondec: 
Designation, as the case may be by the number of document which;, 
consecutive. 
The "Introduction" and Statement of Facts set forth int:. 
Appellant's brief contain so many statements of "fact" which are~ 
included any where in the Record on Appeal,it is felt that t~~ 
ent should set forth the facts in complete detail insofar as dis1 
by the uncontroverted pleadings, rulings, orders and Findings anc 
! 
I 
Judgments below. There will be no attempt here to try to get beil 
this Court many matters which are simply not disclosed in the Re:1 
such as accusations of wrong doing on the part of the Proponent(: 
the Will, who is the Respondent, the type of man the decedent wa! 
intimations he was easily led and influenced by a greedy brother· 
could or did perpetrate a fraud. There is absolutely nothing in 
Record as to these accusations and they reveal a wild attempt to' 
before this Court claims of fraud and undue influence which Appe: 
only hoped he could prove but which he chose not to present to c 
Court below. These stacements are contained in the last Paragr'' 
page 1 of Appellant's brief, tlie first and second paragraphs of 1 
ct 
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2 of the brief and again the second paragraph of page 16 of Ap-
pellant's brief. Ml.at he sought or hoped to accomplish by this 
recitation of so-called facts is not known and they can be dismissed 
by a reminder that they are shown at no place in the Record on 
Appeal. 
This case was never tried on the merits and the one trial 
held, that on the one question of the domicile of the decedent, is 
actually not appealed by the Appellant and there is no transcript 
of this four day jury trial. Since these proceedings have con-
tinued over a period of almost two years and the Record discloses 
numerous orders, motions, continuances, Findings and Judgments, 
the Respondent will attempt to set forth what happened below as 
disclosed by the Record on Appeal. 
The decedent died at Cedar City, Utah on December 21, 1975 
and was at the time of his death, a resident of Cedar City, Utah. 
On December 29, 1975 a petition for the probate of his last Will 
and Testament, executed May 19, 1975, was filed. This will left 
the entire estate of decedent to the Respondent herein, William R. 
Thorley, a brother of decedent, as decedent had never married and 
had no children or family. Another brother, the Appellant, filed 
a contest to this Will and also filed a petition for the probate 
of an earlier will of decedent, in the Superior Court of San Diego 
County, California. The decedent had lived in Iron County for ap-
proximately the first fifty years of his life but then had moved to 
:,u1 Diego County, California where he had lived for almost thirty 
years before moving back to Cedar City where he lived seven months 
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before his death. The entire estate, consisting of real prope:1 
in Iron County and also savings accounts in savings institutio: 
in California, has its situs in Iron County as decedent was do: 
iciled in this County at his death. 
The probate petition filed was set for hearing for two d 
ferent times and each time vacated at the request of counselfu 
Appellant. It was set a third time for April 8, 1976 and althcj 
counsel for Appellant again requested that the setting be vacat~ 
I 
the Court refused to do so whereupon Appellant dismissed his coi 
without prejudice. The Proponent of said will, who is Respond~ 
herein, then made proof on the will and it was admitted to pro~j 
upon full Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment,! 
(Nos. 2 and 3, Respondent's Designation of Record). Approximat:! 
six months later, the same conteE.tant filed a new contest underj 
I 
I 
Section 75-3-12 of the Utah Probate Code. 
Since the proceedings filed in San Diego County by the 
i 
Appellant claimed the residence of the decedent at li.is death to, 
be San Diego County and since the contest filed in Iron County, 
Utah claimed the residence to be either Iron County .QE__San Diei11 
County, California, Respondent herein moved the Court for a Pre:f 
i 
inary hearing or trial to determine this question of resi~~eq 
I 
domicile as it was felt to be jurisdictional. The Appellant re" 
quested a jury trial. The h the trl.al on tr,i Court t ereupon set 
issue of domicile for December 9, 1976 which setting was vacat 
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at the request of counsel for the Appellant. It was next set for 
January 26, 1977 and again vacated at the request of counsel for 
Appellant. The domiciliary trial and also the trial of the Will 
contest on the merits were then set for March 9, 1977, with the 
domiciliary trial to be before an advisory jury. Appellant again 
requested that this setting be vacated which was resisted by Res-
pondent. However, due to the Judge becoming incapacitated, nec-
essitating the calling in of a judge Pro Tern, who declined to hear 
the case, the setting was vacated. The domiciliary trial was then 
set for May 23, 1977 before a jury, to be followed by the jury trial 
on the merits in the event the domicile had been found to be Iron 
County, Utah. 
The domiciliary trial was held between May 23 and May 27, 
1977. Special Interrogatories were submitted to the jury on the 
question of residence or domicile and the jury found the domicile 
of decedent to have been Cedar City, Iron County, Utah at the time 
of his death on December 21, 1975 and Findings of Fact and Conclus-
ions of Law and Judgment were entered by the Court, approving and 
accepting the findings of the Jury( Nos, 17 and 18 Appellant's 
Designation of Record). This domiciliary trial was never appealed 
and there is no transcript of this trial. 
At the conclusion of the domiciliary trial, the Appellant 
requested a one month continuance of the trial on the merits in 
nrJpr to prepare for trial, arrange for his witnesses who were in 
California and also so that he could take an Interlocutory Appeal Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to this Court. This request was granted by the trial Judge as 
felt that that iury should not try the case on the merits andG 
setting was vacated, to be re-set in approximately one month so. 
to give time to Appellant to arrange to have his witneses preser.: 
and so that he could take is Interlocutory Appeal. 
On or about June 1, 1977 the lower ~ourt notified all Uti 
counsel for both the Appellant and Respondent that the case woul: 
I 
be set for iury trial on June 28, 1977. Utah counsel for Appell, 
Michael W. Park, acknowledged that he had received notice of thi:I 
setting and that he had notified California counsel, (Respondenti 
Designation of Record No. 9, Transcript of June 28, 1977 proceec·1 
ings). Formal written notice of the trial setting was given~ 'Ii 
all parties on June 17, 1977. 
On June 28, 1977 all counsel appeared. Counsel for Appe:. 
lant then moved for a Stay so as to permit the Superior Court of 
San Diego County to proceed to hear the case or for a change of 
venue, and also for a two weeks continuance. These motions were 
denied and the jury trial re-set for the following morning, June. 
However, counsel for the Appellant informed the Court they were rl 
ready to try the case and would not even appear on June 29~. ~ 
Appellant and his counsel did not appear on June 29th, the jury "1 
dismissed and the Court heard the testimony of the Proponent anc 
again admitted the Will to probate and dismissed the contest w~ 
prejudice and again entered complete Findings and Conclusioo5 r 
J 
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Judgment on June 29, 1977(No. 24 of Appellant's Designation and 
No. 10 of Respondent's Designation of Record.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING A FURTHER CONTIN-
UANCE OF THE TRIAL SETTING. 
'Ihe many settings of this case below, totalling eight and 
the many continuances have been set forth in the Statement of 
Facts to show there was no abuse of discretion in refusing a Ninth 
continuance. All these different settings and continuances are 
set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
June 29, 1977( No. 10 of Respondent's Designation of Record.) 
It is little wonder 1th.at the Court on June 28, 1977 refused 
another two week continuance. In fact it would have been an abuse 
of discretion for the Court to have done so. 'Ihe setting for June 
28, 1977 was the eighth setting and 27 days notice was given, not 
ten or less as Appellant now claims. Claims of the Appellant that 
he needed this additional time to arrange for his witnesses are 
ridiculous in the light of the many prior settings for which the 
witnesses should have been ready. Claims of the Appellant that he 
did not have sufficient time because this Court did not rule on his 
petition for Interlocutory Appeal until June 27th are without merit. 
The domiciliary trial had concluded on May 28th and yet Appellant 
waited until June 17, 1977 to file his petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal. He gives no reason why he could not have taken this sooner. 
Interlocutory Appeals under our practice are not as a matter of right 
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and are sparingly given. The hope that this Court would j enter: 
this appeal could only have been a false hope or faint one at~ 
and for Appellant to now say that he was not ready to try the 
11 
because of his petition for Interlocutory Appeal is a weak excu! 
at best. Interlocutory Appeals in Utah are only gnmted where 
there is a decisive issue presented which could lay to rest t~ 
entire case without the necessity for a trial as pointed out in 
Manwill vs. Oyler, 361 Pac.2dfl7(l.Jt).In fact Rule 72(b) providin1. 
for Interlocuatory Appeals provides that substantial rights mustl 
be involved which will materially affect the decision. The fact' 
I 
that this Court did refuse to entertain the Interlocutory Appea:i 
shows that the matters appealed were not considered decisive. Thj 
Appellant souglt to have reviewed three Orders of the trial court,i 
I (1) Refusal to stay proceedings on the ground of Comity and For~!· 
Non Conveniens and defer to the Superior Court of San Diego Gour 
i 
California, (2) Refusal to change the venue and (3) Refusal to ' 
order a psychiatric examination of the Proponent of the Will, th1 
Respondent herein. It is submitted that none of these had merit 
even for a final appeal, let alone an Interlocutory appeal. As:i 
I 
(1), an Iron County jury had already found that domicile of the I 
decedent was Cedar City, Utah and for the lower court to have i>'i 
I 
'< 
a Stay order of the proceedings below and deferred to the Supet1·1 
Court of San Diego County would have been not only a serious M 
of discretion, it would have been out-right error. As to (2) : 
change of venue on the showing made was not called for and as r 
particularly set forth in ~int II hereaftei Furthermore, a c:f 
t 
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of venue is a discretionery matter and it most certainly would not 
be a decisive matter an~ay which this court would entertain on 
Interlocutory Appeal. As to (l), the refusal to order a psych-
iatric examinPtion of the Proponent of the Will most certainly 
was proper under Rule 35(a) of our Rules of Procedure which 
--
provides in pertinent part "when the mental or physical condition 
....•• of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is 
pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental ex-
amination by a physician ••••••••••.• " But the mental and physical 
condition of the Proponent of the will, William R. Thorrley, was 
never in controversy. True the mental condition of the decedent was 
at issue and in controversy but not the proponent of the will. 
Furthermore, under the Utah case of Stone vs. Stone, 431 Pac.2d 802, 
this is a discretionary matter and there was no merit to this point 
on appeal, final or Interlocutory. 
It was a mis-placed hope that this Court would grant the 
Interlocutory Appeal and the Appellant should have been ready to 
try the case in any event. 
As stated above, the setting for June 28, 1977 was actually 
made on June 1, 1977 and counsel for Appellant notified. No motion 
for a continuance was filed but only an oral motion made on the day 
set for trial. Rule 40(b) of our Rules of Procedure provides that 
"Upon motion of a party, the Court may it its discretion .... postpone 
·' rria 1 or proceeding upon good cause shown." In First Security 
Bank vs. Johnson, 540 Pac.2d 52l(Utah) the case had been procedurally Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitiza ion provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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delayed for tYJo and half years by interrogatories and various i 
motions and this Court held that a motion for continuar.ce filed 
nine days before the trial setting, did not justify a continuan: 
From this short opinion, it YJould indicate that the long seriesi 
delays, motions, interrogatories and rulings is someYJhat compara'i 
to the record in this case. Furthermore, Appellant admits in hii 
brief that he had depositions of all his YJitnesses, except possill 
one expert YJitness and there should have been no difficulty gett' 
this testimony from his California YJitnesses received. Appellant: 
cites the Utah case of Bairas vs. Johnson, 373 Pac. 2d 375 in I 
support of his motion for a continuance but this case is of no r.1! 
as in that case the plaintiff, YJho YJas an indispensable witness :t 
himself, did not knoYJ until tYJo days before the trial setting t~1: 
his health YJould prevent him from attending trial and the Courti. 
that under these conditions, a continuance should have 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 





On or about June 10, 1977 and after the domiciliary trial,I 
the Appellant filed a motion for a change of venue, supported bi 
Points and Authorities. The claim YJas that true Respondent heret 
YJas prominent, YJas YJell knoYJn in the community, had many financi1j 
connections and YJas a life time resident, YJhereas the Contestant! 
w=1s a resident of California although born and raised in Cedar 
O f bias; that a jury YJould probably be influenced to the point 
his favor. The Court denied the motion to <.:hange the venue on I 
• 
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June 28, 1977 and on June 29th entered the final decree in this 
case. Some time afterward, the Appellant secured and filed in 
the lower court three affidavits in support of the motion for a 
change of venue but which motion had already been denied, one from 
an Ione Bonzo, one from Ada W. Thorley and one from a John Rowberry. 
These affidavits were not on file and were not considered by the 
Court below when ruling upon the motion for a change of venue. 
However, when the Appellant filed his designation of Record below, 
he also filed these affidavits and included them in his Designation 
of Record. However, the court below made an express Order on 
September 15, 1977(Supplemental Record on Appeal) excluding these 
affidavits from the Record on Appeal for the reason they had not 
been filed so they could be considered by the lower court in its 
considerations of the motion for a change of venue. Therefore, we 
have a situation where nothing but the motion and points and auth-
orities was submitted in support of the motion for a change of venue. 
Under the ruling of this court in C. R. Owens Trucking Corp. vs. 
Stewart, 509 Pac,2d 82l(Utah) the court was not obliged to change 
the venue based only upon the assertion that the other party would 
be well known to jurors in the county, particularly where the court 
in the jury selection process excluded any one indicating any bias 
or prejudice . It is submitted the Court could have done the same 
in this case. 
But even if the motion for a change of venue had been sup-
Ported by the claimed affidavits, this court has ruled that prom-
inence of or acquaintance with a party does not amount to such bias 
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that gives "reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be I 
had in the county, city or precinct designated in the complaint" 
to use the language of Section 78-13-9 Utah Code, pertaining to' 
causes for change of venue. The Utah case of Chamblee vs. Stoc: 
& Tibbetts, 344 Pac. 2d 980 held that it was not an abuse of d~ 
cretion to deny a change of venue based on the fact that the de· 
fendant was an elected official, that he was a member of one ofl 
oldest families in the county and that he had many friends in tn;ll 
county. This court in the Chamblee case stated as follows: . 
"It would not be consonant with our traditional ~udicial 
procedures or· complimentary to our jury sys te111 to deny 
a man trial by his neighbors because he happens to be 
an official and had friends and relatives in the co~ 
rnunity." 
Likewise, the Owens Trucking case, supra, held that the reputath 
of or acquaintance with a party was not ground for a change of 
venue. Also in the Bairis case, supra, one of the parties ~dff 
a motion for a change of venue based upon a petition signed bya 
number of local residents to the effect that many people in the 
i 
community had formed an opinion on a vital fact and that it woulc
1 
be difficult to get a fair and impartial trial but this Court he: 
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 
change. 'Illis Court further stated that change of venue was 8 
discretionary matter and that there would have to be an abuse oil 
that discretion before this Court would over-turn the lower co~I 
! 
Also the case of Winters vs. Turner, 2 78 Pac. 816 (Utah) held 
' 
that change of venue was a discretionary matter and an abuse i. i 
have to be shown. Since '·his is the law "·id the lower Court ha;i 
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nothing in the way of affidavits or evidence, how could it now be 
said that the lower court abused its discretion? For the Supreme 
Court to do so it must give weight and consideration and credence 
to matters which were not even before the lower court. 
POINT III 
THE JURY TRIAL HELD BELOW ON THE QUESTION 
OF DOMICILE ACCORDED APPELLANT ALL RIGHTS 
TO WHICH HE WAS ENTITLED. 
In the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, he states he is appeal-
ing from (1) the Order of the lower court refusing to stay the 
proceedings or in the alternative, refusal to change the venue and 
(2) Failure to grant a two week continuance of the trial and (3) 
the final Decree and Findings and Conclusions of June 29, 1977. 
He mentioned nothing about Point III in Appellant's brief wherein 
he now complains that the court below should have granted a regular 
jury trial on the question of domicile and not an advisory jury. 
It should be noted that the Appellant is not appealing this dom-
iciliary trial and there is no transcript of this four day jury 
trial. This matter was concluded June 3, 1977 by the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment which were never 
appealed and are now final. But the Appellant is now attempting 
to attack these findings through the "back door" by claiming that 
he~s not granted a jury trial but only an advisory jury. It is 
true that when the Court originally granted the jury trial on the 
question of domicile, he called for an advisory jury, presumably on 
the ground that the Court considered this was a jurisdictional matter 
ttz to be found by the court. However, it is clear from the proceedings 
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below,(Supplemental Record, Transc. of the May 23, 1977 proceed! 
that the court at least treated the jury as a regular jury and~ 
an advisory jury. From this transcript of these proceedings, t·, 
trial judge made it clear that the Appellant was getting what he 
had asked for, a jury to find upon the question of domicile or 
residence of the decedent, upon full and complete instructions, 
The Findings and conclusions and Judgment(Nos. 17 and 18 of Appei 
I 
lant' s Designation of Record) show that the matter was submitteol 
to the jury on special interrogatories upon which the jury founol 
I 
domicile to be in Iron County. It is submitted that since th~ 
made this finding, it would make no difference whether they 1me 
acting as an advisory jury or as a regular jury. 
Furthermore, the trial judge accepted the jury finding an: 
entered judgment pursuant therewith. The only difference bet~ee: 
regular jury and an advisory jury is that the court need not aCCi 
their "advice" or be bound by it if the court feels the jury fine 
was against the evidence. But so long as the court does accept 
the finding of the jury, then there is no difference. If t~J~ 
had found domicile in California and yet the trial judge had fel 
it was against the evidence and ruled otherwise, then the Appell' 
would have cause to complain, but nut in this case. 
i 
The Appellant at no time or place has shown or claimed th'I 
I 
i · n he was in any way prejudiced by trying this case to an a' viso' / 
jury, if in fact it was one. He has not shown how he would It:: 
tried the case any differently or that he was deprived Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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or that he could have tried the case any more favorably than he 
did. The appellant's claim that he was deprived of a valuable 
right just because the court initially ordered that the case be 
tried before an advisory jury just does not have merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The re-counting of the many settings and continuances, 
delays, motions and hearings, spanning over a period of two years, 
should indicate that the Appellant has never been really serious 
about trying this case in Iron County, Utah. As alluded to in many 
places in the Record, there has been a parallel probate proceeding 
in San Diego County, California. The reason the Appellant has 
never been ready or willing to try the case in Utah has been be-
cause he has been trying desperately to get the case to trial 
first in California. It has been a "race to judgment" situation 
where Appellant has been extremely diligent in trying to get the 
case to trial in California and yet has used every device, delay, 
continuance, motion, hearing and appeal and excuse to head off-a trial 
in Iron County, hoping he would have a more favorable climate in 
San Diego County, California. 
It should be abundantly clear that there is no merit to this 
appeal. The lower court could well have despaired at ever getting 
this case tried and concluded. After the many continuances granted, 
there was no abuse of discretion in the refusal to grant a ninth 
continuance, particularly where the Appellant had had more than 
ample notice of the last trial setting and did not even move for 
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a continuance until the morning the trial was to commence. The 
last continuance granted was for the purpose of gh-ing Appellant 
time to arrange to have his witnesses present and prepare for 
trial and to take an Interlocutory Appeal. Therefore, he had a 
time to be ready and he also took his Interlocutory appeal. 
Refusal of the court to change the venue was not an abuse 
of discretion upon the showing made by the Appellant. 
of this Court establish the rule, in any event, that mere a:quain 
with or prominence of a party or witness, particularly in ourr 
counties in Utah, do not sho\ol bias or that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be had where the trial judge has an opportunity to 
careful in his jury selection process so as to eliminate all pos 
bias. 
Finally, the jury in the domiciliary trial made its findi 
the same \-Jay, \olhether it be a regular jury or an advisory jury 
these findings \-Jere expressly approved and accepted by the trial 
court and a judgment entered thereon and the Appellant has made 
showing that he \-las in any \-Jay prejudiced. 
Dated this 23rd day of January, 1978 
Isom 
Attorney for Respon~~ 
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